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Abstract

Contemporary political action for ethnic and national minorities in Europe appears to be
increasingly directed towards supra- and transnational structures. This development
seems indicative of the growth of a European space for minority activism – a public
space that is less state-centered, that allows claims to be framed in terms of European
standards and therefore facilitates the emergence of an active European citizenship. In
theory, this “Europeanization” of minority politics may offer minority activists additional
avenues for raising demands about cultural recognition and economic equalization. This
article seeks to identify the possible implications of the Europeanization of minority
politics by exploring the case of the Roma (Gypsies), an economically and socially
marginalized minority that is increasingly conceptualized as transnational and
“European.” Especially in the context of the enlargement of the European Union the
Roma have received a lot of attention from European institutions. We focus our analysis
on Hungary, a new EU member state with an active Romani movement. While one would
expect the Europeanization of minority politics to have positively affected the ways in
which Romani activists in Hungary organize and mobilize, our analysis of documentary
sources and interviews reveals a more complex picture. We identify an ambiguous
understanding of the Europeanization of minority politics among various actors in
Hungary and historically shifting ideas about the significance of “Europe” in Romani
mobilization.
Key words: minority activism, ethnic mobilization, Hungary, Roma, European Union,
EU enlargement
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Introduction

Research on ethnic minority politics in Europe has led a number of scholars to argue that
there is a growing link between European integration and minority mobilization. They
argue that the “radical, deep-seated alteration of established boundaries between domestic
and international politics”1 brought about by the presence of international organizations
in Europe such as the Council of Europe, the Organization for Security and Cooperation
in Europe (OSCE) and, especially, the European Union (EU), has created a new space for
collective action beyond the nation-state. Already more than a decade ago, for example,
Yasemin Soysal pointed to European institutions as a potentially powerful source of
transnational empowerment for dispersed immigrant groups in Western Europe.2 And
although her work has often been criticized for overestimating the influence of “postnational” citizenship on immigrant activism, the questions she has asked about the role of
the institutional structure that Europe offers to transnational advocacy for immigrants still
remains firmly on the research agenda of scholars of migration politics. Moreover, these
questions have also become an important focus in research on national and regional
minorities. Michael Keating, for example, has argued that Europe has opened up
opportunity structures for territorially concentrated national minority movements,
offering these movements a chance to enter into a game of multilevel politics that allows
them to moderate separatist claims.3 Not only immigrant communities in Western Europe
are thus sometimes seen as groups for whom the nation-state is no longer the single most
important locus of political action, but also ethnic and national minorities in both in
Western and in Central and Eastern Europe are now often interpreted as groups whose
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political claims transcend nation-state boundaries, are build on “universal” goals and
Europe-wide standards such as human rights and minority rights, and have been shaped
by the presence of supranational institutions.
In this article we focus on ethnic minority activism in the new EU member states
and ask how minority activists in this region have perceived this matter. Have activists
indeed recognized the presence of international institutions as a new space for collective
action? And if so, how have these “transnational spaces for discourse and action”4
transformed the nature of domestic collective action for minority groups? It seems logical
to start from the hypothesis that European institutions have at least had the potential to
affect ethnic minority activism in Central Europe. Since the development of political
opportunity and political process perspectives in social movement theory, there is a
growing consensus that a number of key elements in the development of social
movements are connected to the institutional context in which they operate (the “political
opportunity structure” or POS).5 According to this theory, movements are to a large
extent shaped by the political opportunities that surround them, including the
“transnational” opportunities.6
In this paper we start from the theoretical assumption that the EU offers new
opportunities for political action and that minorities who petition against the nation-state
are likely to turn to this new space of political action beyond the nation-state. Analyzing a
specific case of minority mobilization in Central Europe, however, we find evidence that
questions the direct positive influence of Europe-wide institutions on minority
mobilization and suggests instead a more complex picture. We take as our case the
Romani (Gypsy) movement in Hungary. The Romani movement is an interesting case
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because it has in recent years increasingly received attention from international
institutions in Europe. Although the Roma in the past were defined in different ways (as a
national minority, a caste, an ethnic group, a social underclass, or a transnational group),7
there appears to be an emergent hegemonic discourse in which they are represented as a
“European minority”. This categorization is adopted by domestic governments and
academics alike,8 but it is primarily a conceptualization that is implicitly or explicitly
advanced by international institutions in Europe, such as the Council of Europe, the
OSCE and the EU.
We focus on Hungary because this country is the home of one of the most vibrant
Romani movements in Europe and the only country in the current EU that has two
elected politicians in the European parliament who are Romani activists. This case also
offers us the opportunity to compare the situation before the country’s accession to the
EU in 2004 with empirical material from more recent years.
Our project needs to be distinguished from two other bodies of literature. First of
all, we are not seeking to examine the EU’s influence on Hungary’s minority policies. In
the context of the study of EU enlargement there is some important work now on the
influence of international norms and incentives on the development of domestic minority
policies in Europe.9 But there is still little systematic research into the question of how
“Europe” as a set of institutional resources and a framing device has affected the action
repertoires and self-categorization processes of domestic ethnic minority movements.10 It
is the latter question that we would like to address.
Secondly, we do not seek to go into the question of whether Roma identify with
the European project. Of course, it would be interesting to examine what “Europe” means
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for those who are perceived as members of the Romani minority. There is little
sociological research on this question available, but the ethnographic research projects
that have focused on identification processes among the Roma clearly suggest that there
is little familiarity among them with the conceptualization of them as a European
minority.11 Our question is slightly different. Instead of asking how the people who are
seen as Roma see themselves, we seek to examine how they are represented by activists.
We focus our attention on the framing strategies of those who want to mobilize the Roma
in a political movement.
This paper consists of three main sections. In the first section we show how in the
1990s the Roma in Central European countries became a special focus of the EU in the
context of the EU enlargement, and how Romani activists in Central Europe responded to
this development. On the basis of interviews with Romani activists in Hungary conducted
between 1998 and 2002 this section shows how mixed the responses of the activists
towards the “Europeanization” of the Romani issue really were.
The second part of the paper goes deeper into this ambivalence in Hungary by
documenting government and Romani activist responses to the problem of Romani
migration, a matter that was generally regarded as one of the main issues of contention
relating to the Roma in the period before Hungary’s accession to the EU.
In the third section we turn to the analysis of data from the first two years of
Hungary’s EU membership. With the election of two Hungarian Romani women to seats
in the European Parliament, European institutions are gaining attention in Romani
activism and the Hungarian political parties are presenting themselves as champions of
Romani human rights at the level of European institutions. Hungary’s MEPs increasingly
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present Romani issues as a trans-European problem affecting both Eastern and Western
Europe. We explore how Hungarian Romani activists at the national and transnational
levels view the possibilities and limitations of belonging to “Europe.”

1. Conditionality policy and the Roma in the EU enlargement process

Throughout the past 50 years, discourses on human rights have been central to the
legitimization of new, transnational European institutions.12 Since the founding treaties of
1949 and 1950, European officials have striven to present European institutions as
guarantors of “human rights and fundamental freedoms,” and since the 1990s “respect for
and protection of minorities” has become an integral part of the European integration
endeavor. At the time when he was the President of the European Commission, Romano
Prodi used the slogan, “a Europe of minorities,” in several high-profile speeches.
More than any other international organization in Europe in the 1990s, the EU
was able to turn policy-making on minority issues in post-communist Central Europe into
a matter of international politics. The EU tried to exert a direct influence on minority
policies in its candidate member countries by explicitly linking normative pressure with
membership “conditionality.” While there has since long been a general and tacit
commitment to human rights norms within the EU, in the course of the 1990s the
commitment gained a more explicit profile in the organization’s external policy demand
for adequate minority protection in the Central European candidate countries.
In 1993 the European Council meeting in Copenhagen decided that respect for
and the protection of minorities would serve as one of the political prerequisites for future
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membership.13 The European Council had hoped that as a consequence of their strong
desire to join the EU, the candidate countries would be inclined to acknowledge their
accountability with regard to minority treatment and introduce new legal frameworks and
policy initiatives. In other words, the introduction of political conditionality was based on
the assumption that introducing comprehensive conditions for EU membership on the
basis of large principles would incite prospective members to introduce specific policies
that could clearly be evaluated against these large principles. Although formulated in
terms of broad norms, this policy strategy was clearly not in the first place an exercise in
norm-setting. At least part of the EU’s policy was explicitly connected to a strategy
aimed at preventing the importation of ethnic conflict to EU territory and preventing the
emergence of new waves of refugees from candidate countries to the EU. The EU’s push
towards a greater internationalization of minority rights was thus informed by a mixture
of humanitarian, “hard” and “soft” security concerns.14
In order to accomplish its goal, the EU relied on the norm-setting strategies of
other international organizations. In the early 1990s the OSCE had been the first regional
organization in Europe to place the issue of minority protection at the center of its
activity in Central and Eastern Europe by explicitly linking minority protection to
strategies of conflict prevention. In 1997, the European Commission’s Agenda 2000
referred to both the Council of Europe’s Framework Convention on the Protection of
National Minorities and the Council of Europe’s Recommendation 1201 (1993) on
minorities, documents which were strongly based on the notion of cultural recognition.
But more than the OSCE and the Council of Europe, the EU had the capacity and the
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financial resources to influence minority policies of other states and to empower citizens
to challenge their governments.
In the course of the 1990s the topic of the Roma gradually became an important
point of reference within the framework the EU’s conditionality policy. This was partly
induced by the growing media coverage of the appalling treatment of a great number of
Roma, and partly the result of work by international NGOs such as Human Rights Watch,
Amnesty International, Project on Ethnic Relations, and the European Roma Rights
Center. In addition, EU attention was stimulated by a small group of independent Roma
activists who had been able to voice their concerns in international forums such as the
Council of Europe and the OSCE. This led to a significant criticism directed towards the
Central European governments in the European Commission’s Agenda 2000 (1997). The
European Commission pointed out that the treatment of minorities was in general
satisfactory, “except for the situation of the Roma minority in a number of applicants”.15
The message was that the situation of the Roma was to play a certain role in deciding
whether a candidate member would be ready to join the EU. This became even more
apparent when the Commission started publishing its yearly “regular reports.” In these
reports the situation of the Roma in the candidate countries was repeatedly mentioned as
an area of growing international concern and criticism.
In the literature on conditionality there is considerable debate over the
effectiveness of the EU’s membership conditionality policy,16 as well as over the
implications of setting specific requirements on minority protection.17 A question that is
not directly addressed in the literature, however, is whether and to what extent the
minority activists in Central Europe perceived EU conditionality in the field of minority
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treatment as beneficial. The Romani activists interviewed in Central Europe between
1998 and 2002 were rather ambivalent about that.18 On the one hand, they believed that
the international political context surrounding the EU enlargement had indeed a positive
impact on their position. On the other hand, in many cases they also pointed to the
difficulty of turning the pressure exerted by the EU into an effective tool of Romani
mobilization. There are a number of ways in which this ambivalence becomes clear.
In general, the ambivalence among the Roma was a result of the lack of clarity as
to whether the EU’s policy was really an instrument to set norms on minority recognition.
By including the requirement of minority protection, the EU aspired to serve as an anchor
of stability for its unstable neighbors to the East. But by relying on documents that
symbolized norms of cultural recognition, there was at least the impression that the
ultimate goal was to stimulate domestic policies that would focus on cultural recognition.
However, at the time when this requirement was set, norm about how exactly minorities
should be protected and whether cultural recognition was the ultimate goal were matters
that were still unclear in the EU’s internal affairs. The debate on the protection of
diversity and anti-discrimination was still very much underway. Despite pressure kept up
by the European Parliament since the mid 1980s to adopt protective European legislation
in the field of anti-discrimination and anti-racism, it had taken more than a decade before
an important step in this direction was taken with the ratification of the Treaty of
Amsterdam.19 In sum, Romani activists were rather confused about whether there were
indeed EU standards and norms to be implemented, whether the EU would be satisfied if
states introduced policies of cultural recognition, or whether minority protection was
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simply a very flexible and minor requirement, subordinate to considerations related to
pragmatic interests and international security.
But also more specific concerns about the way the EU had highlighted “Central
Europe” and “the Roma” as important focal points in its criticism in the regular reports
became a worry among many Romani activists. Some activists could sympathize with the
argument made by some politicians in Central Europe that the minority protection
requirement itself was discriminatory. The provenance of the EU’s concern over
minorities seemed to lie, not with conflicts on EU territory that had led to serious political
violence, as seen in Corsica or Northern Ireland, but with ethnic conflict in the Balkans
and Central Europe. The EU’s specific stance towards post-communist Central and
Eastern Europe seemed to be built on the popular assumption that the “ethnic” East is
historically more inclined to ethnic conflict than the “civic” West. In Central Europe this
assumption was deemed very problematic because it invoked a simplistic stereotype of
the region as part of the “backward East”.
Related to these problems was the vagueness of the minority protection criterion
when it came to the Roma. The descriptions of the situation in the Commission’s yearly
“regular reports” were rather brief and general, and, more importantly, they did not
indicate exactly to what extent the situation had to be made better in order to result in a
positive evaluation. The regular reports did not list any concrete requirements on the
introduction of national legislation prohibiting discrimination in crucial areas such as
employment, education, or housing. Consequently, there was a broad margin of
interpretation on how to satisfy the minority protection requirement.
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Another important problem Romani activists identified in the EU’s conditionality
policy was the effect such a policy could have on the image of the Roma. With the
growing attention to the Roma in the context of EU accession, Romani activists feared
that EU involvement would reinforce widespread negatives stereotypes in which the
Roma would be held responsible for hindering the accession of certain candidate
countries. That this fear was not unfounded is illustrated by the way domestic actors
responded to the problem of Romani migration and asylum seekers. In the next section
we briefly focus our attention on a specific case to illustrate this point.

2. Romani activism in Hungary before 2004: Romani migration in the context of the
EU enlargement

In the run-up to the EU enlargement in 2004 the Commission’s reports repeatedly
complained about the problem of anti-Roma discrimination in Hungary. We found that
the response of Romani activists to this criticism was an ambivalent one. Some supported
it, argued that it was a logical policy, and saw it as a way towards the final recognition of
a place for the Roma in Europe as transnational minority.
Some Hungarian Romani activists, however, became increasingly reluctant to
refer to the EU’s conditions and the Commission reports because they feared that society
would hold them responsible for hindering EU accession. Thus, instead of inadequate
minority protection being seen as an obstacle for EU membership, they thought that the
Roma themselves would be perceived as the obstacle. For a long time Romani activists
had been wondering how they could protest a situation when the situation was framed as
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the result of their own behavior. The EU membership standards did not solve this
dilemma. In fact, international pressure on Central Europe exerted by individual EU
states responding to Romani asylum seekers at some point even seemed to exacerbate this
problem.
The migration issue is a domain where one can most clearly identify the
development of a divide in the Hungarian Romani movement revolving around the
question of whether Europe should be seen as the most appropriate arena for political
action.
In 1997, a number of Hungarian citizens applied for political asylum in Canada
and EU member states. According to figures of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR), the total number of Hungarian asylum applicants in 1998 was 1,033. This
figure rose to 1,532 new applications in 1999, 2,612 in 2000, and 4,022 in the year 2001.
In 2002, this development made Hungary, after Colombia and Mexico, the country with
the highest relative increase of asylum seekers.20 The facts were noticeable especially in
Canada, where the Hungarians formed the largest group of refugee claimants—most of
them identifying themselves as Roma and claiming that they were discriminated against
in their home country. 1997 can clearly be identified as the year setting the trend for the
spectacular increase. In 1996, the total number of Hungarian applicants for Canada was
64; in 1997 the number rose to 294, in 1998 to 977, in 1999 to 1,581, in 2000 to 2,474,
and in 2001 to 3,812.21 As will be discussed, Hungarian Romani organizations did not at
all agree among themselves on the question of whether the situation in Hungary justified
the Roma’s claims for asylum. Nevertheless, some pressure groups tried to use the
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controversy about the wave of asylum seekers in their much wider protest campaigns
against the Hungarian government.
One case that merits attention in this context is that of a group of twelve Romani
families from the town of Zámoly who in July 2000 applied for political asylum in
France. József Krasznai, president of a local Romani organization (the Fejér County
Romani Association), member of the National Gypsy Self-Government and vicepresident of the Roma Parliament, acted as a spokesman for these families both before
and during their migration to Strasbourg. He immediately attracted the attention of
domestic and international politicians and journalists. It seems useful to recount here the
details of this case, since it offers a good view of the various sides of the Hungarian
Romani movement. It also illustrates quite well how other actors, such as the
government, the opposition parties and human rights organizations, have responded such
episodes of increased Romani movement activity.
The origins of the case date back to 1997. In that year a storm damaged one of the
buildings in which a number of Romani families were living. The local authorities tore
down the entire set of houses but failed to provide viable alternative accommodation. In
response, the National Gypsy Self-Government22 relocated them and used funds to erect
temporary housing. Meanwhile tensions rose within the community. Non-Romani
inhabitants of the village began to reproach the Roma for having occupied the local
community center for too long a period. This was exacerbated by local and national press
reporting which argued that the Roma were “receiving flats from the state as a privilege
conferred on them on the basis of ethnic origin, as ‘presents’ which they had in no way
deserved.”23 In 1999, a fight broke out in which one of the non-Roma involved was
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severely injured and died. According to József Krasznai, this event polarized the
community even further, and the Roma received death threats. Believing that, in case of
an attack, they would not be able to count on protection from the police, the Romani
families decided to travel to Strasbourg and claim political asylum. In March 2001, 15 of
the 46 people who had originally left Hungary were granted political asylum by the
French Office for the Protection of Refugees.
Gradually the case assumed a meaning that was larger than that of the concrete
realities of the case. Spokesman Krasznai was able to attract domestic and international
media attention not only to these specific Roma but also to the situation of the Roma in
Hungary in general. He attempted to turn his work on this specific case into a general
protest action against the Hungarian government’s treatment of the Roma. Several
features of the case contributed to this. First, even before the departure of the Romani
families to France, Krasznai had argued that the Hungarian government was responsible
for finding a solution for them. Before leaving Budapest he had organized a press
conference and had warned the government that if it did not take measures, he would
leave the country. Secondly, by choosing Strasbourg as a destination, Krasznai placed the
whole case in a European context. He told the press that he had written complaints to the
European Court of Human Rights, the Council of Europe, and the European Parliament.
Upon arriving in France he also sent a letter to the French President, Jacques Chirac,
requesting his support for the asylum application and asking him to use his influence to
persuade the Hungarian government to improve the conditions of the Romani
communities. By so doing Krasznai managed to touch upon an important foreign policy
concern of the Hungarian government: its reputation among the EU countries. The
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Hungarian government was brought into a position where it was forced to respond. When
in October 2001, Krasznai was asked whether he considered Romani migration an
effective method of protesting, he stated the following:

Yes, I think so. Everyone was talking about it. Never before could the Roma attract
so much attention to their situation. During the first three months in France, the
government didn’t take our demands seriously. But after the stay was extended and
a couple of them received political asylum, the government began to take the case
seriously. (personal interview, 5 October 2001)

Significant, too, is that Krasznai’s protest letters received backing from a number of wellknown intellectuals in Hungary, most of them close to the opposition party SzDSz. In
March 2001, a letter signed by among others the internationally renowned authors Péter
Esterházy and György Konrád was sent to the French Prime Minister, Lionel Jospin,
thanking France for granting political asylum to the Roma from Zámoly. The letter
compared the decision of the French authorities with the “protection [that] has been given
to many Hungarians during various centuries, most recently during the 1956 Hungarian
revolution.” It also stated that the decision of the French authorities would “serve as a
moral lesson for Hungarian society.” 24
One can summarize Krasznai’s framing of the Zámoly case in three general
points: (a) the case of the Zámoly Roma is indicative of the situation of the Roma in
Hungary in general; (b) the Roma in Hungary are threatened by racist violence, lack
protection from the authorities, and suffer from a general climate of discrimination by the
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authorities; (c) current policies and minority rights protection systems initiated by the
government have failed to change this situation, and this is why so many Roma resort to
seeking asylum in what they regard as safer countries. In their discussion of the case,
government officials and mainstream politicians emphasized other elements. According
to the official government view, the Roma were not leaving for reasons of discrimination,
but to escape socioeconomic marginality. The Hungarian government claimed that it had
already invested unprecedented amounts of money into programs aimed at alleviating the
Roma’s socio-economic predicament; therefore, it argued, Romani activists should now
help the government to implement these programs. The government also argued that
Romani migration was incited by individuals who had no other aim than to discredit
Hungary’s reputation among the EU countries.
With regard to the first element in the government’s counterframing, it has to be
noted that the government was not able to avoid talking about the existence of ethnic
discrimination in Hungary. During his speeches in the Hungarian Parliament in 2000 and
2001 Csaba Hende of the right-wing party Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF), and at
the time undersecretary of justice, admitted the existence of discrimination but argued
also that it did not constitute a legitimate reason for the Roma to claim asylum, since
measures were implemented to remedy such problems. To buttress this reasoning,
government officials referred to the fact that in the overwhelming majority of earlier
cases Romani asylum claims had been refused on the grounds that the claimants were
clearly not persecuted by state authorities and did not lack protection against
discriminatory practices. Government representatives such as Hende did not deny the
existence of discrimination, but simultaneously argued that it was not a phenomenon
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unique to Hungary. Instead he called it an “all-European problem with ramifications
effecting Hungary, a problem which cannot, due to its gravity, be solved until Hungary’s
accession to the European Union.”25 In this way the government attempted to take the
edge off the main argument of those who argued that the government was responsible for
causing the Romani migration; at the same time it expressed an opinion that was perfectly
acceptable to a large part of the Hungarian Romani movement.
The government’s argument that Romani migration was deliberately organized by
individuals to discredit both the Hungarian government and the Hungarian Roma,
persuaded many of the Romani activists into criticizing the asylum seekers.26 A large
number of Romani activists did not want to see the Roma blamed for blocking Hungary’s
entrance in the EU. In response to the government’s point of view, the president of the
National Gypsy Self-Government, Flórián Farkas, declared that he was opposed to Roma
seeking asylum abroad, since this in his view caused “damage to Hungary’s reputation.”27
For this reason he also tried to dissociate the Zámoly affair from the general situation in
Hungary.

The Zámoly affair cannot be lumped together or mixed up with the situation of the
Roma in Hungary in general. The Zámoly affair is a quite particular one, a peculiar
internal concern, an internal problem, which I am not delighted about. I do not
agree with this particular act of emigration even though I identify myself
emotionally with the families concerned. Leaving this country is not a viable
solution.28
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It is interesting—and perhaps telling for the persistence of the division within the
Hungarian Romani movement—that the National Gypsy Self-Government, and the
Romani activists affiliated to it, stood uncritically by the government’s opinion on the
Zámoly case even when government officials on the basis of the case made questionable
statements about the Roma in general, alleging that the Roma themselves are in part
responsible for the fact that the government has been unsuccessful in alleviating the
socioeconomic problems that this population is faced with.

3. EU-phoria? Hungarian Romani activism after EU accession

In April 2003, Amaro Drom, the widest-circulating Hungarian Roma-themed magazine,
printed a cover with a picture of an activist wearing a necktie printed with flags of every
EU nation and smiling broadly with the large caption, “EU-foria” (“EU-phoria”).
Although the magazine had printed over a dozen articles on Romani issues and EU
accession since 2000, the tone of those articles was generally cautious and critical. With
the 2004 election of Livia Járóka, a Hungarian MEP who was also the first Romani
activist in the European Parliament, the magazine threw caution to the wind. In July
2004, the magazine printed a photo of Járóka in front of the European Parliament
Building in Strasbourg with the caption, “Roma woman among the black Mercedes
limos.” The rapidly changing patterns of EU-phoria and euroscepticism among Romani
activists in Hungary pose an interesting paradox.
Prior to 2004, the relationship between Romani mobilization and Hungary’s EU
aspirations was fraught with the uncertainties—whether or not conditionality could be
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used as a leverage point in domestic civil rights struggles, and whether or not Roma
activists should present themselves as Hungarian citizens facing discrimination or as a
transnational ethnic minority. When Hungary entered the EU, however, state officials and
members of every political party made efforts to present the country as committed to
addressing discrimination against the Romani minority. Within six months of accession,
Hungarian voters elected two young Romani women, European Peoples’ Party (EPP)
candidate Járóka and Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE) candidate
Viktória Mohácsi, to serve as MEPs.29 Both activists had worked on Romani rights issues
in the NGO sector before being elected to the European Parliament. A non-Romani
Hungarian MEP from the European Socialist Party, Katalin Lévai, made the situation of
Romani minority a touchstone of her parliamentary work. These developments point to
the rising importance of human rights discourses in establishing legitimacy for European
institutions, and with it, new discursive resources for proclaiming transnational allegiance
alongside patriotism to the nation-state and for reframing Romani grievances at the
international and national level.
When the Hungarian delegation to the European Parliament held a press
conference to commemorate their first year in the EU, it cited their efforts to improve the
conditions of Hungarian Roma and the Hungarian ethnic minority in Serbia as early
successes.30 The delegation underlined the leadership of the two Hungarian Romani
MEPs in putting forth the Resolution on “The Roma in the European Union,” which the
European Parliament unanimously passed in April 2005.
Responding to the pre-accession stereotype that Eastern Europeans would be
more nationalistic than their western European counterparts, the Hungarian delegation
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presented itself as “European” by allying itself with minority protection and taking the
lead in Roma issues. As they pushed for the passage of the “Roma resolution,” Hungary’s
Romani MEPs went further, emphasizing that although fighting anti-Romani
discrimination was a condition for eastern European countries’ entry into the EU, the
problem occurs in both eastern and western Europe. During the parliamentary debates on
the resolution, MEP Járóka stated:

Roma people living inside and outside the boundaries of the EU have been exposed
to daily discrimination for centuries. (…) Following EU accession, social
discrimination against the Roma continues in the new Member States, even as it
does in the existing ones.31

In an interview with a reporter from the Hungarian Romani magazine Amaro Drom,
Járóka cited the lack of commitment of older member states to the task of eradicating
discrimination within Europe, stating:

For years, Greece has been receiving large sums of money to eradicate substandard
Roma settlements but the funds have not trickled down and the settlements around
Athens are in the same state that I saw them in five years ago when I was there as a
student of anthropology.32

Reflecting on the passage of the “Roma resolution,” MEP Viktória Mohácsi underscored
the significance of recognizing anti-Romani racism at the European level:
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The importance of the text (…) is that this is the first time that the European
Parliament or the EU has declared that within its own borders, there is a human
rights problem. (…) It openly states that the Romani people face discrimination and
human rights problems, not just in the ten (accession) countries, but in the old
fifteen also. (personal interview, 15 June 2005)

These discourses present racism against Romani as a European issue and not just an
example of Eastern Europe’s “backwardness” relative to the purportedly advanced
democracies of “core Europe.”33 By chastising East and West alike, EU-level Romani
human rights activists have been able to make their case without appearing disloyal to
their nation-states, which are frequently portrayed in the international media posed as the
“new Europe” that is only now developing the democratic traditions and Enlightenment
values enjoyed by citizens in Western Europe.
A second theme emerging in EU-level discourses on the Romani people is that
they are an emergent “European minority” notable for its presence in every country and
for the severe discrimination they face from majority groups. Hungarian MEP Katalin
Lévai stated, for example, “The largest ethnic minority in Europe today are the
approximately 15 million Roma people, who form one of the most disadvantaged social
groups of the Member States.”34 According to MEP Mohácsi, however, the
unresponsiveness of national governments renders the Romani minority more favorably
disposed to transnational Europe:
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According to public opinion polls, it is in Europe where Romas [sic] feel most
European. This statement is not at all surprising, as Roma people are no longer able
to believe their own government in any country, especially in Central Eastern
Europe. Term after term, different political parties keep replacing each other, but
none of the governing political parties have been able to provide a solution to this
problem and eliminate discrimination, for instance. The only hope of the Romas
lies in the European Union and European Parliament.35

Mohácsi makes clear her criticism of national governments and her hope that European
institutions can place pressure on politicians at the national level, beyond the
“conditionality” period. Although her strong words do not spare the Hungarian national
government, they are somewhat mitigated by the fact that three of the Hungarian MEPs
(Mohácsi, Jároka, and Lévai) played key roles as advocates of the Roma resolution.
Finally, increasing attention to Romani human rights at the EU level offers new
discursive frames and institutions for addressing Romani grievances, including
transnational anti-racist rhetoric and programs, equal opportunity offices and legal tools,
and European policies and networks designed to fight “social exclusion.” Activists can
achieve new forms of recognition, not just of “minority rights” in the older sense
employed in Hungarian institutions, but also in the sense of public recognition of antiRoma racism in both Eastern and Western Europe. Using the frame of “social exclusion”
allows activists to move beyond the traditional minority protection concerns of cultural
and linguistic preservation. Hungarian Romani civil rights activists were initially
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skeptical of MEP Mohácsi’s contention that Roma are a group that identifies closely with
“Europe,” citing the poorest Romani communities’ segregation and lack of mobility:

There are villages where the kids never leave the area because there’s no money.
They grow up not having seen more than one or two Magyars, or gaje. They only
meet other Roma. In the 20th century. In an EU member state. And beside the
shopkeeper, the old farmer women or the priest they don’t run into gaje. I mean,
what’s up with that? (personal interview, 29 April 2005).

Aladár Horváth, one of the leading Hungarian Romani activists, acknowledges the
potential usefulness of the recognition of the Roma as a minority group excluded by
racism, however:

The Roma are a European people in the sense that they are present everywhere
around Europe. But if it’s true that one third, or one half of the Roma live in an
African state of poverty then there is Africa in Europe, and the Roma are not the
most European people but rather they represent discrimination, they represent
segregation from European society. The Roma are the most European people in the
sense of how racist and discriminatory Europe is. (personal interview, 29 April
2005).

A number of activists interviewed expressed frustration with the requirement that EU
applications include a large number of civil organizations because Roma NGOs in the
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countryside do not have the relationships or networking capacity to build such
collaborative projects.
Horváth and other domestic Romani activists as well as some external observers
have cautioned that focusing on the European level may divert attention from the nationstate’s responsibilities to its Romani citizens. In the past, Hungarian Roma
overwhelmingly preferred to present their case in terms of rights as citizens or an ethnic
minority group within Hungary. Hungarian Romani activists generally avoided framing
Romani identity as one of a “transnational nation without a homeland” because this frame
appeared to downplay their claims to their rights as Hungarian citizens. More recently,
however, the relative success of Hungarian Romani activists in European institutions has
led them to present themselves as the representatives of all the Roma in Europe.
In the 1990s Romani activism in Hungary was largely based on the premise that
the Roma had to be regarded as a national minority and that their claims needed to be
situated in the arena of the national state. In contrast to many other national minorities in
Central and Eastern Europe the main focus of activism was not territorial selfdetermination, but anti-discrimination, cultural autonomy and social policy. The main
issue dividing Romani activists in the 1990s was the question about whether independent
protest action was the only acceptable way of organizing politically, or whether it was
more appropriate to work within the state structures and state institutions meant to offer
the Roma special channels for participation in the local and national decision-making
processes.
Since 2004, there has been no single issue or case that stands out as an “emblem”
of the new phase in the way that the Zámoly case highlighted the dilemmas of Romani
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mobilization during Hungary’s march toward accession. MEPs are working on issues
that, while European in scope, resonate with Hungarian Romani activists’ everyday
concerns: unemployment, health, and education. An emerging issue is the distribution of
EU funds for a housing program targeting Romani settlements, but it is still too soon to
know exactly what shape the program will take and how activists will respond to it (it is
notable to mention that housing was the original starting point for the Zámoly case).
As in the earlier Zámoly case, the political opportunities gained by taking Romani
grievances to the European level are offset by potential drawbacks: possible cooptation of
Romani mobilization at European level; institutional barriers to grassroots Romani
participation at the European level; and the ongoing problem of uneven commitment at
the national and local government level despite lofty statements to the contrary when a
“European” audience is present. Of these problems, Hungarian Romani activists from
NGOs in Budapest, Nográd county, Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplény county, and Somogy
county repeatedly emphasized the incompatibility between European institutions and
funding mechanisms and emergent Romani civil society organizations, when interviewed
in 2002 and 2005. Institutional barriers are a particular concern for Aladár Horváth:

But, to turn to things that really matter, structurally the European Union at this
point is an organizational system unfit for realizing the integrationist ambitions of
the Roma. It is a slow, overly bureaucratic organization motivated by economic
interest. (personal interview, 29 April 2005).
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A number of activists interviewed expressed frustration with the requirement that EU
applications include a large number of civil organizations because Roma NGOs in the
countryside do not have the relationships or networking capacity to build such
collaborative projects.

Conclusion

Applying Albert Hirschman’s concepts to our case, we might conclude that the essential
tension in Romani activism in Hungary before 2004 in the context of EU enlargement
was one of “voice” versus “loyalty,” with very little interest in “exit,” in this case
emigration or international shaming. When a small group of Romani asylum seekers were
granted refugee status in France, it merely contributed to the “voice” versus “loyalty”
debate in the domestic context. It did not lead to the visible growth of a transnational or a
“European” wing in the Hungarian Romani movement. There were few initiatives from
Hungarian Romani activists to pursue a European agenda versus a national agenda. Even
when Romani activists relied on European institutions and on a Europeanized discourse,
they only did so in order to pursue change in the domestic context.
This situation seems to have become somewhat different after 2004. Here we see
a shift in the use of “Europe” in activist discourse. There does seem to be evidence of a
growing group of Hungarian Romani activists who do pursue a European agenda for the
Roma. Rather than simply arguing that this is the result of the emergence of a European
political opportunity structure for Romani mobilization, we argue that the growing
Europeanization of Romani activism in Hungary after 2004 rather seems to point to the
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growth of a mutually reinforcing relationship between the minority activism and the
attempts of the EU to construct a European citizenship. If the Romani movement needs
Europe as an external mirror with the potential to “shame” national governments,
European institutions may “need” Romani petitioners because whenever social
movements or other groups of citizens ask for support, it “ratifies” Europe as a political
body that is legitimate, responsive to citizens, and able to act on their behalf. Thus, even
when activists make demands beyond the competencies of European institutions, these
petitions potentially forge links between the institutions and the group.
Minority groups like the Roma seem thus to be moving from serving as a “litmus
test” of Europe’s ability to integrate diverse groups to serving as a model of
“cosmopolitan” European citizenship. Like the Jewish minority in Europe, the Romani
minority has traditionally served as the excluded “other” of dominant national groups
across the continent and was targeted for extermination in the Holocaust. While it seems
unlikely that European politicians will soon be citing the Romani people as an exemplar
of “European citizenship” (or even as a “model minority”), official discourses supporting
a “Europe of minorities” do provide new discursive resources and symbolic capital to
Romani ethnic mobilization.
In the long term the results are potentially far-reaching. If Romani activists and
European institutions indeed have much to gain from one another and are in fact part of a
mutual (but politically unequal) process of co-constitution, ratification, and legitimation,
one could wonder whether the adoption of a “European” identity frame by some Romani
leaders in the long term might be able to transform the fact that “majority” populations
exclude Jews, Roma, and Muslims on the grounds that they are not “European”? Or are
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minorities such as the Roma in danger of becoming isolated in Europe because of their
identification with Europe? Following the resounding “no” votes against the European
Constitution, will a time come when only minority activists identify with Europe? The
evidence in this paper does not point to any clear answers to these rather speculative
questions, but it does make clear that the relationship between Europe and minority
activism is more complex than one would expect. When one observes a growing support
for minority claims from Europe-wide institutions and the emergence of a new European
space for minority activism, one should not conclude that minority activism will
automatically benefit from this support in a predictable way.
More generally, the case of the Hungarian Roma points to the need to
problematize the concept of a “European political opportunity structure” for ethnic
minority movements. Just as movement identities (including ethnicity) are constructed by
a range of actors in the course of collective action (rather than that they are a stable
source of collective action), one can argue that transnational political opportunities are
constructed during the process of mobilization. Identifying these political opportunities is
not at all an easy affair. In order to know whether institutional and political developments
on the transnational level can function as opportunities, it is necessary to examine
carefully the ways in which actors perceive, interpret and portray these developments.
The Romani movement with its dispersed target audience and fragmented
organizational structure might seem an extreme case, but we submit that this case points
to a complexity that affects an increasing number of ethnic minority movements in the
contemporary world. The growing transnational space for discourse and action may
deeply influence the development of ethnic movements, but it is not so that ethnic
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minority movements will automatically be able to build their action upon what at first
sight appears to be a transnational political opportunity. In other words, this paper adds
empirical support to the assertion recently made one movement scholar:36 although
political opportunity approaches help us understand movement development, they do so
only if we adopt a dynamic model of opportunity and examine how opportunities actually
work in relation to a variety of political actors and outcomes.
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